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Abstract: It can be often observed in contingent valuation surveys that some respondents do not
agree to pay some money for a public good, for reasons that differ from a genuine indifference to
the good. For example, some people may dislike the idea of placing monetary values to public
goods like the environment or a historical monument. Some may protest against the inefficiency
of the public administration in managing public funds, and refuse to pay a tax. Others may
behave strategically, if they think that their answer could influence the actual level of taxation.
A good survey design can effectively reduce them, but protest votes can hardly be completely
removed from the dataset. The question is how to deal with them. Sometimes they are considered as
true zero values, or, if the dichotomous choice method is used, as if they were below the minimum
bid. Obviously, if the unwillingness to pay reflects only a protest and not a low or null valuation of
the good, this procedure results in downward biased estimates of the wtp measure. It is of
paramount importance that the questionnaire contains a follow up question for individuals that
refuse payment, to investigate about their motivations, and interpret the responses.
Alternatively, observations with protest votes are simply cut off the sample, and only the
subsample with positive reservation prices is considered in the analysis. This procedure will not
have any effect for the validity of the estimates only if there is no sample selection bias. Otherwise,
it leads to incorrect estimates for the willingness to pay.
In this paper we present a sample selection model that allows to take into account, and correct,
the possible bias due to protest votes. It is shown that selection bias can sensibly affect the estimates
for the willingness to pay for the public good. It will be seen that the model may present estimation
2problems because of flatness of the likelihood function. In some cases confidence intervals around
the sample selection coefficient are too wide to give evidence of presence or absence of sample
selection bias. It is argued that even in these circumstances the sample selection model with the
protest votes should be preferred to the model without protest votes, since it takes into account the
uncertainty about the estimates of the willingness to pay.
3Introduction
A problem often encountered in contingent valuation analyses is that individuals asked about
their willingness to pay for a given good or service may answer that they are not willing to pay
anything. A zero value is not a problem if the respondent is sincerely indifferent to the good, since
in that case the stated value reflects the true value. However, it can be often observed that
respondents place a zero value in the wtp question for reasons that differ from a genuine
indifference to the good (Donaldson et al. (1996); Mitchell and Carson (1989, pp.166-7). For
example, some people may refuse the idea of placing monetary values to public goods like the
environment or a historical monument. Some may protest against the inefficiency of the public
administration in managing public funds, and refuse to pay a tax. Others may behave strategically,
if they think that their answer could influence the actual level of taxation.
To some extent, distortions can be controlled by a good survey design: strategic behavior can be
prevented by making clear that the respondent's action is very important for informative purposes,
but is not going to have any influence on the level of fiscal pressure. Protest votes caused by
mistrust about the efficiency of the public administration could be removed by using a payment
vehicle other than taxes. A device often adopted is the collection of special funds, which should be
administered by trusts over which citizens may exercise their control. However, this alternative may
cause other problems. If payment to the trust is taken on a voluntary basis, strategic behavior can
again affect the answers, especially in social contexts where voluntary contributions to the provision
of public goods are not much usual. A compulsory payment to a trust, on the other hand, would
presumably cause another type of bias, due to the unrealistic setting. A requirement for reliability of
contingent valuation studies is that the scenario should be credible enough to produce sensible
answers.
Thus, protest votes can hardly be completely removed from the survey dataset. The question is
how to deal with them. Sometimes they are considered as true zero values, or, if the dichotomous
choice method is used, as if they were below the minimum bid. Obviously, if the unwillingness to
pay reflects only a protest and not a low or null valuation of the good, this procedure results in
downward biased estimates of the wtp measure.
Alternatively, and more frequently, observations with protest votes are simply cut off the sample,
and only the subsample with positive reservation prices is considered in the analysis (Whitehead et
al. (1993); Mitchell and Carson (1989)). As we will see in the next sections, this procedure will not
have any effect for the validity of the estimates only if the probability of obtaining a protest
4response from individuals with specific socioeconomic characteristics is independent of the value
they give to the good.
If a continuous type elicitation format is used, a nested Tobit model is the correct specification:
its theoretical structure has been introduced by Lee (1992), applied by Howe et al. (1994) to
contingent valuation data. We are not aware of any specification proposed in the literature to deal
with selectivity when the elicitation question is in the dichotomous choice format.
2. The model
Protest responses can be controlled for by constructing a system of sequential questions about
the individual's willingness to pay for the good. For example, when the elicitation method produces
a specific value, as in the open ended or the bidding game formats, a follow up question may be
posed to those that put a zero value, asking to motivate their answer. Alternatively, and especially
when the dichotomous choice format is applied, the elicitation question is preceded by a question
asking the individual if he or she would be favorable to the imposition of a tax (or the request to pay
a ticket, depending on the payment vehicle that was chosen) to contribute to the provision of the
good. If the individual says yes, a follow up question is posed to elicit the individual's wtp. If the
individual says no, a follow up question asks to motivate the answer. This structure allows selection
of observations with positive wtp, and gathering of enough information to understand the nature of
each case of unwillingness to pay for the good: whether it should be treated as a genuine
indifference to the public good, or rather as an expression of protest, either against the public
administration, or against the interview. When the respondent displays indifference toward the
public good, we assume that the reservation price is below the minimum bid proposed.
Together with the responses of the individuals that are favorable to the payment of a tax (ticket)
for the public good, these observations give a direct information about the individual willingness to
pay.
If the respondent instead displays interest toward the public good, but nevertheless refuses the
idea of contributing to the payment because of protest to the management of the public budget, no
information about the reservation price can be gathered.
Data produced by this design can be expressed through a dichotomous variable, assuming value
1 if information about the individual's willingness to pay is available, and zero otherwise. When this
dummy variable is equal to 1, another dichotomous variable indicates willingness to pay a given
amount: the bid that was actually offered to the individual, or the lowest bid for those who showed
indifference toward the public good.
5These responses can be modelled simultaneously with two equations: the first one is the
selection equation, a d to the second one is the elicitation equation. The model proposed applies to
the dichotomous choice elicitation method, but a similar procedure can be adopted when the
elicitation format provides continuous wtp data, using a tobit instead of the probit in the elicitation
equation.
We define the binary variable Y1 for the selection equation and Y2 for the elicitation equation,
depending, in turn, on two latent variables *1Y  e 
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The latent variable *2Y  is the willingness to pay: an individual accepts to pay the amount t if his
willingness to pay is greater than the proposed bid and refuse to pay the amount t otherwise. B t Y2
is observed only if Y1=1: the observed outcomes of Y2 are conditioned on Y1=1. Estimation of
willingness to pay based only on observed responses of Y2 could be incorrect if there is bias
introduced by the self-selection of individuals that answered No to the first question.
To check for the presence of sample selection bias we suggest to model the two choices
simultaneously. Let x1 and x2 be two vectors of socio-economic characteristics of individuals (not
necessarily distinct), and assume a linear specification for the two models:
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where u1 and u2 are two error terms with joint c.d.f. ),( 21 uuF .
The model can be summarized as follows:
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and the likelihood function can be written as follows:
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which implicitly contains the joint probabilities of *1Y  and 
*
2Y , and the marginal probability of 
*
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6Usually ),( 21 uu  is assumed to have bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance
matrix
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the variance of *1Y is set to 1 for normalization while the variance of 
*
2Y  is estimable due to the
variability of the bids among individuals. The log-likelihood can be written in the following way:
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where we indicate with )(1 ×F  the c.d.f. of the univariate standard normal distribution and with
);,(2 r××F  the c.d.f. of the bivariate standard normal distribution with correlation coefficient r.
The correlation r between the error terms in the two equations accounts for the presence of
selection bias in the estimates of the parameters of the model: if 0=r , the two choices are
independent among sample observations, and we could obtain unbiased estimates of the parameters
simply fitting two separate equations for Y1 and Y2; otherwise, if 0¹r , the estimate of the
willingness to pay is biased, the sign depending on the sign of the correlation. In particular if 0<r
we would under-estimate the willingness to pay while if 0>r  we would incur in over-estimation
of willingness to pay, when considering only observations with Y1=1.
Estimates of the parameters rsbb ,,, 221  can be obtained simultaneously, by maximizing the log-
likelihood with respect to all arguments. However, Copas (1990) notes that the likelihood functions
of models like (1)-(2) often shows non-regular behaviour and suggests not to base the judgement on
the presence of selection bias exclusively on the asymptotic standard errors estimated by means of
the inverse of the information matrix. Because the likelihood is well-behaved for fixed values of r,
his suggestion is to evaluate the likelihood profile )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ|( 221 sbbr  for a grid of values of r in the
interval (-1,+1) and calculate an approximate confidence interval for r s
{ }21,1)(2)ˆ(2: acrrr -£- ll  around the maximum )ˆ(rl . If the interval contains the value zero then
we can conclude that there is no selection bias.
Estimates of the mean willingness to pay can be obtained from the estimates of 2b in this way:
722
*
2 )( bxYE ¢=
and a confidence interval for )( *2YE is calculated with the analytical formula suggested by Cameron
(1991):
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where V is the variance-covariance matrix of 2b . This is different from calculating the mean
willingness to pay from observed responses of Y2 b cause:
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 is the bias due to selection of individuals, the sign depending on the
sign of r: if 0<r  we under-estimate the mean wtp while if 0>r  we over-estimate the mean wtp.
3. The Data
We present now an application of the sample selection model introduced in the previous
section. We use data from a preliminary stage of a contingent valuation analysis for a urban park in
the metropolitan area of Cagliari, Italy.
Since the scope here is only illustrative of the sample selection model, the description of the
survey will be limited to the essential. We used a dichotomous choice model for elicitation of the
reservation price. Before the elicitation question was posed, the individual was asked if he or she
would have been favorable to the imposition of a tax, on the top of the income tax he or she already
paid, to help the provision of the public good. For individuals answering yes, a follow up question
was posed to elicit the willingness to pay; for individuals answering no, a follow up question was
posed to select people indifferent to the public good from people that were giving protest responses.
Unfortunately, not enough care was posed in collecting the latter information, and this resulted in
many missing or invalid data: therefore, we could not properly select between individuals that were
genuinely indifferent to the public good and those that were giving a protest response. It will be our
care, for the second stage survey, to be more scrupolous in collecting this information. Since these
data do not allow selction between individuals that (directly or indirectly) provided a valuation for
the public good, and people that, because of protest, did not evaluate the good, the selection variable
8in the following application is just the answer to the question about the attitude toward the payment
of a tax.
The questionnaire contained questions aimed to gather information about the socioeconomic
characteristics of the respondent. Information leaflets were attached to give a description of the
project. It was especially emphasized that the park could supply leisure services: sport facilities,
playgrounds for children, observation points for birdwatching, and similar services to be consumed
in the leisure time.
Our final sample consisted of 184 observations: 102 individuals answered that they would
be favorable to the payment of a tax, and were then asked about their willingness to pay.
4. Results
The model estimated had two regressors in the selection equation, and only one regressor in the
elicitation equation.
In order to enhance the reliability of the estimates, we followed the procedure suggested by Copas
(1990) discussed in section 2: we first obtained a likelihood profile for a grid of parameter values of
r in the range [-1,1], and then obtained its maximum likelihood estimate by optimizing the profile.
Results for the parameter estimates are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Sample selection model and Censored sample model estimates
Parameters Sample Selection Censored Sample
Selection eq.
N.obs. 184
Estimates S. Error p-value Estimates S. Error p-value
Constant 0.6423 0.3833 0.0469 -- -- --
Leisure 0.8429 0.2247 0.0001 -- -- --
Age -0.0141 0.0071 0.0234 -- -- --
Elicitation eq.
N.obs. 102
Constant 357.32 63.37 0.0000 274.34 47.36 0.0000
Inactive -96.63 56.76 0.0443 -113.59 60.73 0.0307
s 207.52 53.76 0.0001 187.38 50.36 0.0001
r -0.69 -- -- --
9The model reported in Table 1 has been selected against other possible specifications on the basis of
Likelihood Ratio tests for nested models, and the Akaike Criterion for non nested models (cfr.
Greene (1993)). The variables selected are: age, which is a continuous variable ranging from 19 yr.
to 80 yr., with a mean of about 50 yr. The variable leisure is a dichotomous variable, with value 1 if
the individual has an expenditure for leisure activities of more than 20% of his or her personal
income; otherwise the value is zero. The percentage of individuals in the sample with higher leisure
time expenditure is about 26%. Finally, the dummy variable “inactive” distinguishes students,
retired, housewives and unemployed individuals from those that are currently working: the
percentage of "inactive" people in the sample is about 36%.
From the coefficients of the sample selection equation we can infer that the probability to consent to
the introduction of a tax for the public good is higher for younger people and for people that spend
more of their income in leisure. When we look instead at the elicitation equation, we see that the
actual level of willingness to pay for the good depends on the professional condition of the
individual. As it can be easily guessed, the group of "inactive" people is willing to pay a lower price
for the public good. The professional condition can be considered as a proxy for personal income:
just as the variable leisure, which when taken alone in the elicitation equation is also significant,
with a positive sign.
The dependent variables in the sample selection equation and in the elicitation equation are
negatively correlated (conditional on the independent variables), as implied by the sign of the
coefficient r, and the magnitude of correlation is not negligible. This result seems counter-intuitive,
since it would imply that people that are more favorable to the introduction of a tax to help the
provision of the good are also willing to pay less. From the follow up question asking the
motivation of their opposition to a tax for the park, many answered that taxation is high enough
already, and that the public administration should be more efficient in the budget management. A
possible interpretation for the negative sign of the correlation coefficient is that people that protest
more for the imposition of taxes are people that already pay high income taxes because of higher
incomes. On the other hand, if people in the higher income class decide to accept the payment, they
will probably have higher reservation prices than individuals with lower incomes. The effect of
income in the two decisions is not entirely taken into account by the independent variable, since
they are just approximations. If this interpretation is correct, the sample selection model would
effectively account for protest votes.
As it can be seen from Table 2, the 90% confidence interval about r (represented by digits in bold
italics) include the r values in the range [–0.9, -0.1]. It can be observed that the log-likelihood in
10
this range is very flat, producing a wide confidence interval that covers almost all negative values.
We can anyway confidently exclude the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias (r = 0).
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Table 2  Log-likelihood for values of r in the range [-1,+1]
r Log-likelihood
-1 -199.87214
-0.9 -168.82186
-0.8 -168.50982
-0.7 -168.42507
-0.6 -168.46207
-0.5 -168.57602
-0.4 -168.74370
-0.3 -168.95261
-0.2 -169.19619
-0.1 -169.47155
0 -169.77846
0.1 -170.11881
0.2 -170.49666
0.3 -170.91858
0.4 -171.39464
0.5 -171.94026
0.6 -172.58026
0.7 -173.35826
0.8 -174.36359
0.9 -175.83995
1 -466.38070
The estimates for mean wtp (and relative confidence interval) are reported in Table 3 for the
specification with and without sample selection. The estimates are reported for different values of
the regressor Inactive in the elicitation equation. As expected, given the negative sign of the
correlation coefficient, the estimates produced by the sample selection model are higher than those
obtained from the subsample with positive willingness to pay. It can also be noted that confidence
intervals for the estimates of the sample selection model are wider than those obtained from the
censored sample model.
Table 3  Mean WTP and confidence intervals for sample selection
and censored sample model.
Model Mean WTP Confidence interval for
mean WTP
Sample selection
Inactive 260.69
(53.18)
172.52 - 348.34
Active 357.32
(63.37)
252.25 – 462.40
Censored sample
Inactive 160.76
(44.25)
87.39 – 234.13
Active 274.34
(47.35)
195.82 – 352.87
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Conclusions
We saw that estimates from the sample selection model are quite different from those
produced by the censored sample model, where the sample selection bias is not accounted for. We
presented an application where the confidence interval about the correlation coefficient allows us to
exclude the hypothesis of null correlation between the responses of the selection equation and the
elicitation equation. In other terms, since the hypothesis of sample selection bias is accepted, use of
the censored sample model would lead us to incorrect estimates for the valuation of the public good.
Unfortunately, as shown by Copas (1990), sample selection models are often characterized
by very flat likelihood functions, which may cause estimation problems if algorithms do not
converge, or, even if they do converge, the standard results of the asymptotic theory cannot be
applied to the model. In these situations nothing conclusive can be said about the presence (or not)
of sample selection bias. A possible solution could be given by increasing the number of
observations: however this is often not feasible, and indeed the same sample selection model is
needed to correct for an imperfect design in a completed survey. Alternatively, when the confidence
interval around the selection parameter is so wide that nothing conclusive can be said about the
presence or not of sample selection bias, the analyst may use a priori information to restrict the
hypotheses about the value of the correlation coefficient. In any case, when nothing conclusive can
be said about the correlation coefficient, it is advisable to accept the sample selection model rather
than the censored sample model: this allows to take into account the uncertainty about the wtp
estimate. Calculating the central measure for the wtp for different possible values of rho may give
quite different values: the confidence interval will be very wide, and allows for more conservative
estimates than those obtained with the more precise, but possibly biased, censored sample, model.
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